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Abstract
With the advance of web technologies, a large quantity of transactions have been
processed through web services. Service Provider needs encryption via public com-
munication channel in order that web services can be delivered to Service Requester.
Such encryptions can be realized using secure session keys. Traditional approaches
which can enable such transactions are based on peer-to-peer architecture or hierar-
chical group architecture. The former method resides on two-party communications
while the latter resides on hierarchical group communications. In this paper, we
will use three-party key establishment to enable secure communications for Service
Requester and Service Provider. The proposed protocol supports Service Requester,
Service Broker, and Service Provider with a shared secret key established among
them. Compared with peer-to-peer architecture and hierarchical group architecture,
our method aims at reducing communication and computation overheads.
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1 Introduction
Resource delivery can be any activity through networks involving service re-
quest and provision. It may be for individuals, companies or government agen-
cies. Because of the various possible attacks through heterogeneous networks
[1, 5, 7, 13, 45, 28, 34, 35], resource delivery requires some security mecha-
nisms to protect data privacy associated with the requested resource. Service
requester and service provider are distributed over different networks and do-
mains. Therefore mechanisms for preventing eavesdropping of data from unau-
thorized parties have to be considered in any resource delivery which may be
sensitive [1 - 7, 9, 19, 48, 22, 47, 39, 40].
Consider the following scenario for an e-government: Suppose the Taxation Of-
fice is a service requester. The Taxation Office (TO) may request an individual
visa and employment history. The service provider can be the Department of
Education and Employment(DEEW). The Department of Immigration and
Citizenship (DIC) can act as a broker. Thus, DEEW can provide TO with
the requested resource via DIC. Since DIC is a trusted party, the communi-
cations between TO and DEEW can be delivered via DIC. Another example
is: You may use your mobile phone to direct your home computer to transfer
your meeting schedule to your office printer and print out this schedule for
you. Your mobile phone will act as a service requester and your office printer
is a service provider while your home computer is a broker in this scenario.
In the above scenarios, the three parties in each situation can share one same
session key for their resource delivery service. In this paper, we will develop a
secure service protocol for this kind of resource delivery. Our method is based
on non-commutative monids and one-way hash function. We will propose a
two-way authenticated and three-party key establishment protocol which can
address the above two scenarios.
A key establishment protocol is used to derive a shared secret by two or more
parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each
of these, but no single party can predetermine the resulting value. The secu-
rity of most key establishment protocols were based on large integer factoring
infeasibility or discrete logarithm infeasibility [41]. Several key establishment
protocols based on group theory have been proposed [8, 49, 12, 30]. How-
ever, all these protocols are for two parties to establish a secret key. These
schemes cannot be transferred to the three-party scenario in their present
forms. Therefore, it is interesting to propose three-party key establishment
based on non-commutative monoids. In addition, the proposed key establish-
ment should be immune from the existing attacks on algebraic method based
cryptographic primitives.
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It is true that the WS-world was not initially expected to serve in low-
computation devices or similar scenarios that may have particular restrictions
in their overhead, but in servers providing these WS-enabled services. How-
ever, we notice that the increasing popularity of the mobile devices such as
laptop, PDA, and tablet type devices allow new opportunities to develop solu-
tions beyond mobile email including other activities of web services. Therefore,
it also opens a new window for delivering the mobile infrastructure which can
support mobile web services. Apparently, low communication and computa-
tion overheads are positive for mobile web services. That is a sound motivation
behind our proposal for the presented two-way authentication and three-party
key establishment. There are of course many other motivations. One of them
could be reducing time associated with secure web services arising from high
overheads.
Some basic security requirements for resource delivery where three parties
(service requester, broker and service provider) are involved are identified as
follows:
• Requirement 1. Authentication: Before the resource delivery is executed,
the participated parties need to be authenticated. That is, Service requester
needs to be authenticated to Broker and Service provider. Broker needs to
be authenticated to Service requester and provider. Service provider needs
to authenticated to Broker and Service requester. All the authentications
are required to be two-way authentication [5, 7, 11, 16, 17, 31, 40, 42 ].
• Requirement 2. Data Privacy: In the whole course of resource delivery, data
privacy should be protected. It has two requirements: on the one hand, data
associated with the resource should not modified while being delivered; on
the other hand, data associated with the resource should be kept unknown
to any unauthorized party [18, 21, 46, 32, 42].
Requirement 1 can be attained through password-based authentication which
is adopted in our proposed two-way authentication in section 4. Requirement 2
can be attained through session key establishment and secure resource delivery
using the established session key.
We need to clarify that other security requirements such as confidentiality,
authorization, integrity and non-repudiation (see [41] for the details of these
definitions) are also needed for full and secure deployment of the above two sce-
narios. However, our proposal only focuses on data authentication and privacy.
Other techniques such as encryption and digital signature can solve confiden-
tiality and authorization or non-repudiation requirements [41]. Access control
techniques and policies can address the authorization requirement [41]. There-
fore, we did not address them in the proposed protocol.
The use of web services can pose serious risk if security is not properly ad-
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Fig. 1. Two different shared keys are established in the peer-to-peer model.
dressed from the beginning. The purpose of our proposal is not to examine
current web service security standards but to facilitate secure web service
transactions within a service oriented architecture by using our three-party
schema which does not rely on a static and pre-built secure communication
channel. Web service networks are dynamic and grow organically, which in-
creases the cost of management and administration. Because of the dynamic
nature, it is not realistic to rely on a static and pre-built secure communication
channel for some concrete applications such as those two scenarios mentioned
above. Our proposal can be combined with some of current web service secu-
rity standards such as Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [5], XML
Encryption [3], and XML Signature [2] to enable authorization information,
end-to-end encryption, and message integrity.
2 Related Work
In this section, we will review some existing schemes which provide secure web
services for service discovery and low-cost devices.
If there are three parties in the service delivery process, then peer-to-peer
based model leads to two different shared keys which would be established.
See the example as in Figure 1.
Helander and Xiong proposed a secure web service framework based on peer-
to-peer model [23, 25]. That framework provided two-way authentication and
peer-to-peer key exchange. Their method were based on RSA and AES [41].
The two-way authentication and peer-to-peer key exchange were done with
RSA. The transmission and communications were encrypted with an AES
peer-to-peer key. RSA-based method is well-known energy-consumed due to
its large number involvement (e.g. 2048 bit-length number may be needed for
maintaining some security level) [41].
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Campo et al.’s security model is based on hierarchical group communication
[48]. The authors developed a multiprotocol service discovery platform. They
studied mechanisms to enhance availability of services in the network. They
did not present a concrete scheme for their framework.
The protocol in [51] was the service discovery chosen by the Bluetooth SIG
to search for services in Bluetooth networks. Clients connect to all the prior
discovered devices in the proximity and check if they are offering the desired
service. This protocol uses a very simple scheme where security relies on a
secure pairing between devices and scalability is limited to a low number of
devices. It only works for Bluetooth networks and there is no way to run it
on any other network technology. These features are not enough in terms of
security and scalability.
The protocol in [36] supported multicast mechanism, by which the client mul-
ticasts a template of the service and any server receiving the message compares
the pattern with its own services. If any service matches, the server answers
to the client with the address of the service. The drawback of this protocol is:
every client needs to maintain the public key of every server in the network.
Another issue is sending the address in clear makes IP spoofing possible [41,
42].
Authentication and key establishment can be realized using either the sym-
metric key method or the public key method [41]. The first symmetric key
protocol involving online trusted third parties was proposed by Needham and
Schroeder in [29]. This protocol was shown to be insecure by Denning and
Sacco in [37]. The insecurity is because of one party being not able to ensure
messages are fresh. Denning and Sacco suggested fixing the freshness flaw in
[29] by the use of timestamps.
Otway and Rees in [43] proposed another symmetric key based protocol which
involves an online server. This protocol was compromised by Burrows et al in
[14] by fooling one party to believe a public message is a new established key.
Woo and Lam in [27] proposed another two-way authentication and key es-
tablishment protocol. This protocol was compromised by Clark et al. in [24]
using a parallel session attack. The parallel session attack can enable party
A to fool party B to accept a previously established key as a new one. This
attack is not a particularly strong attack but indicates that the protocol does
not provide the authentication property. Lowe in [33] developed a more serious
attack using message component symmetry.
Needham and Schroeder in [29] proposed a public key based protocol which
involves an online trusted third party. The public key based method needs
the deployment of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Therefore, it is expensive
from a system cost point of view. This protocol was broken by Lowe in [33].
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Fig. 2. One shared key is established in our model.
Neuman and Stubblebine presented another protocol in [20] which was broken
by Hwang et al. in [10].
Compared to all the above protocols, the ISO/IEC protocol [50] is an efficient
one which is based on the symmetric key method without an online trusted
third party. Our proposal will use the method of symmetric key protocol with-
out an online trusted third party.
In order to address the above issues, we will propose a new web service pro-
tocol which uses two-way authentication and three-party key establishment
for resource delivery. Our protocol is targeting at three-party resource deliv-
ery scenario, i.e. there are three participants, Service requester, Broker, and
Service provider. They only need to establish one shared key for fulfilling the
resource delivery securely. The figure 2 gives an overview for this scenario as
above:
3 Preliminary
In our scheme, we use non-commutative monoids for the session key estab-
lishment. In this section, we therefore review the mathematical definition for
monoids, generators, submonids, commutative monoids, and non-commutative
monoids.
Monoids have not been much utilized and studies in cryptography although
there are several key establishment protocols based on monoids were developed
[8, 49, 12]. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first one which
introduces monoids for web service protocols. Therefore, it is necessary to
give a background regarding monoids in this section.
Definition In abstract algebra, a monoid is an algebraic structure with a
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single, associative binary operation and an identity element. A monoid is a set
M with binary operation ∗ : M× M → M, obeying the following axioms:
• Associativity: for all a, b, c ∈ M, (a ∗ b) ∗ c = a ∗ (b ∗ c).
• Identity element: there exists an element e ∈ M, such that for all a ∈ M,
a ∗ e = e ∗ a = a.
• Closure: for all a, b ∈ M, a∗b is in M. Alternatively, a monoid is a semigroup
with an identity element.
A monoid satisfies all the axioms of a group with the exception of having
inverses. A monoid with inverses is the same thing as a group [26, 38].
Definition Generators and Submonoid [26, 38]: A submonoid of a monoid M,
is a subset N of M containing the unit element, and such that, if x, y ∈ N,
then x ∗ y ∈ N. It is then clear that N is itself a monoid, under the binary
operation induced by that of M. Equivalently, a submonoid is a subset N such
that N=N*, where the superscript * is the Kleene star. For any subset N of
M, the monoid N* is the smallest monoid that contains N.
A subset N is said to be a generator of M if and only if M=N*. If N is finite,
then M is said to be finitely generated.
Definition Commutative monoid: A monoid whose operation is commuta-
tive is called a commutative monoid (or, less commonly, an abelian monoid).
Commutative monoids are often written additively. Any commutative monoid
is endowed with its algebraic preordering , defined by xy if and only if there
exists z such that x + z = y. An order-unit of a commutative monoid M is an
element u of M such that for any element x ∈ M , there exists a positive integer
n such that x nu. This is often used in case M is the positive cone of a partially
ordered abelian group G, in which case we say that u is an order-unit of G.
There is an algebraic construction that will take any commutative monoid,
and turn it into a full-fledged abelian group; this construction is known as the
Grothendieck group [26, 38].
Definition Partially commutative monoid: A monoid for which the operation
is commutative for some, but not all elements is a trace monoid; trace monoids
commonly occur in the theory of concurrent computation.
Definition Acts and transition systems: An operator monoid is a monoid M
which acts upon a set X. That is, there is an operation · : M × X 7−→ X
which is compatible with the monoid operation.
* For all x ∈ X: e · x = x. * For all a, b ∈ M and x ∈ X: a · (b · x) = (a · b) · x.
Operator monoids are also known as acts (since they resemble a group action),
transition systems, semiautomata or transformation semigroups [38].
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Definition Non-commutative monoid: A monoid whose operation is non-
commutative is called a non-commutative monoid (or, an non-abelian monoid).
4 Web Service Protocol for Service Requester and Service Provider
In this section, we will provide the security protocol for web service delivery
designed for service requester and service provider. An overview of the new
protocol will be first presented. A concrete construction will be developed after
the overview.
4.1 Overview of the protocol
The proposed resource delivery protocol is composed of four procedures:
Step 1. System Setup This procedure is used to set up system parameters.
Two computable and non-commutative monoids S and T are needed in the
protocol. Three maps f , β and θ are operations over S and T. H() is a one-way
hash function, which maps elements in T to T. Ek() is a symmetric encryption
algorithm which uses k as a secret key. There is a system initiator which helps
Service requester, Broker and Service provider setup those parameters.
Step 2. Two-way authentication and Session Key Establishment In
order to find the resource for Service requester and to securely delivery this
resource from the right Service provider to the right Service requester, se-
curity mechanisms need to be designed to satisfy the purposes. Here we use
two-way authentication and session key establishment to obtain the security
mechanisms. Two-way authentication [31] means Service requester, Broker
and Service provider are authenticated with each other. The session key es-
tablishment is used to set up a secret session key between Service requester,
Broker and Service provider.
Step 3. Session Key Confirmation After Service requester, Broker and
Service provider execute the Session Key Establishment procedure, they need
to run the Session Key Confirmation procedure. The Session Key Confirmation
procedure is used to confirm Service requester, Broker and Service provider
with the fact that they really share a secret key.
Step 4. Transaction Encryption and Service Delivery After the Session
Key Confirmation procedure returns ‘true’, Service provider can use the shared
secret key to encrypt the resource (service) and sends it to Service requester. If
any dispute is raised, Broker can use the shared key to decrypt the ciphertext
and resolve the dispute.
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4.2 Construction of the protocol
Assume three participants Alice, Broker and Service provider will be involved
in the following protocol. Their unique means of communications is through
public channels. Here one-time three-party key agreement indicates that the
participants re-choose their secret keys for every time protocol run. This can
help to prevent attacks from compromising possible long-term secret keys.
Step 1. System Setup
Consider a 5-tuple: (S,T, f, f1, f2), where S and T are computable and non-
commutative monoids. The three maps f , f1 and f2 are operations over S and
T and defined as follows:
f : S× S 7→ T
β : S×T 7→ T
θ : S×T 7→ T
They adhere to three axioms [30]:
• Axiom 1: For all g, g1, and g2 ∈ S, f(g, g1 · g2) = f(g, g1) · f(g, g2);
• Axiom 2: For any g, h ∈ S, β(g, f(h, g)) = θ(h, f(g, h));
• Axiom 3: Given public elements g1, g2, ..., gn ∈ S, h ∈ S is a secret element,
while
f(h, g1), f(h, g2), ..., f(h, gn)
are publicly known. Then, to determine h is not computable in polyno-
mial time (i.e. it is infeasible in polynomial time to obtain h by solving
f(h, g1), f(h, g2), ..., f(h, gn) ).
The system also needs a one-way hash function H(), which maps elements in
T to T. The system initiator further selects a symmetric encryption algorithm
Ek(), which uses k as a secret key. The system initiator helps Service requester,
Broker and Service provider setup those parameters.
Here, Service requester is an entity who makes request for resource delivery.
Broker is an entity who helps service requester find the required resource from
an available service provider. Service provider is an entity who can supply the
resource required by the Broker on behalf of service requester.
Suppose n1, n2, and n3 are three positive integers. We assume
(1) SA 6= SB,
(2) SB 6= SC
(3) SC 6= SA
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for the following three monoids SA, SB, and SC.
(1) Service requester is assigned a public monoid SA $ S. Suppose SA is
generated by the elements
a1, a2, · · ·, an1 .
That is, for any element x ∈ SA, x can be represented as x = ∏n1i=1 ak(i)i ,
where ki (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) are non-negative integers .
(2) Broker is assigned a public monoid SB $ S. Suppose SB is generated by
the elements
b1, b2, · · ·, bn2 .
(3) Service provider is assigned a public monoid SC $ S. Suppose SC is
generated by the elements
c1, c2, · · ·, cn3 .
(4) Service requester randomly chooses n1 non-negative integers e1(1), e1(2), ··







Then a ∈ SA (Service requester keeps e1(i)(1 ≤ i ≤ n1) privately). She
then computes
f(a, b1), f(a, b2), · · ·, f(a, bn2)
and
f(a, c1), f(a, c2), · · ·, f(a, cn3)
Service requester’s secret key is a while the public key includes {f(a, b1), f(a, b2), ··
·, f(a, bn2)} and {f(a, c1), f(a, c2), · · ·, f(a, cn3)}.
(5) Service requester then registers {f(a, b1), f(a, b2), ···, f(a, bn2)} and {f(a, c1), f(a, c2), ··
·, f(a, cn3)} to the system initiator. The system initiator generates a
pseudo ID PID1 and a certificate ϕ1 for Service requester.








Then b ∈ SB (Broker keeps e2(i)(1 ≤ i ≤ n2) privately). Broker then
computes
f(b, c1), f(b, c2), · · ·, f(b, cn3)
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and
f(b, a1), f(b, a2), · · ·, f(b, an1).
Broker’s secret key is b while public key includes {f(b, a1), f(b, a2), · ·
·, f(b, an1)} and {f(b, c1), f(b, c2), · · ·, f(b, cn3)}
(7) Broker then registers {f(b, a1), f(b, a2), ···, f(b, an1)} and {f(b, c1), f(b, c2), ··
·, f(b, cn3)} to the system initiator. The system initiator generates a pseudo
ID PID2 and a certificate ϕ2 for Broker.
(8) Service provider randomly chooses n3 non-negative integers e3(1), e3(2), ··







Then c ∈ SC (Service provider keeps e3(i)(1 ≤ i ≤ n3) privately). She
then computes
f(c, a1), f(c, a2), · · ·, f(c, an1)
and
f(c, b1), f(c, b2), · · ·, f(c, bn2).
Service provider’s secret key is c while public key includes {f(c, a1), f(c, a2), ··
·, f(c, an1)} and {f(c, b1), f(c, b2), · · ·, f(c, bn2)}.
(9) Service provider then registers {f(c, a1), f(c, a2), ···, f(c, an1)} and {f(c, b1), f(c, b2), ··
·, f(c, bn2)} to the system initiator. The system initiator generates a pseudo
ID PID3 and a certificate ϕ3 for Service provider.
Step 2. Two-way Authentication and Session Key Establishment
This procedure is composed of two sub-steps. It first enables Service requester,
Broker and Service provider to authenticate each other. It then helps them to
share a secret key
k = H(β(a, f(b, a)) · θ(c, f(b, c)) · θ(a, f(c, a))).
Step 2.1. Two-way Authentication After a potential service provider has
been located, it is time for authentication and key exchange. Basically, au-
thentication with PKI is a process to verify if a public key belongs to the right
entity [31]. If a public key is verified to belong to an entity, then one can trust
that any information encrypted with the public key can only be understood by
the entity with the right private key. The attributes are used to check against
an Access Control List to do authorization [31]. However, the PKI-based au-
thentication method is expensive for mobile web services as the certificates
need the deployment of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [41]. Therefore,
our proposal will adopt the password based authentication which is actually
pre-shared secret authentication and was also integrated within TLS [41].
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The added-value of our proposal compared to SSL/TLS or any of their evo-
lutions to three party communications is that our proposal based on non-
commutative monoids does neither need very large number computation in
RSA or DSA settings nor need point multiplication in ECDSA setting while
the current SSL/TLS authentication and key exchange candidates are RSA,
DSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECDSA, ECDH, and SRP.
It is assumed that Service requester, Broker and Service provider share a
password γ. The password can be shared in an off-line way. Here we do not
spare more space on how the password is distributed to Service requester,
Broker and Service provider but focus on the two-way authentication below.
(1) Service requester sends PID1, and E(γ : Nsr, P ID2, P ID3) to Broker and
Service provider. Here E(.) is a symmetric encryption algorithm (AES can
be a candidate). Nsr is a nounce which is used to differentiate different
authentication copies.
(2) Broker sends PID2 and E(γ : Nbr, P ID1, P ID3) to Service requester and
Service provider. Nbr is a nounce which is used to differentiate different
authentication copies.
(3) Service provider sends PID3 and E(γ : Nsp, P ID2, P ID1) to Broker and
Service requester. Nsp is a nounce which is used to differentiate different
authentication copies.
(4) After receiving messages, Service requester first decrypts E(γ : Nbr, P ID1, P ID3)
and E(γ : Nsp, P ID2, P ID1) to get Nbr and Nsp, respectively. It then
sends E(γ : Nbr, Nsp, P ID2, P ID3) to Broker and Service provider. Bro-
ker and Service provider can authenticate Service requester by verifying
Nbr and Nsp.
(5) After receiving messages, Broker first decrypts E(γ : Nsr, P ID2, P ID3)
and E(γ : Nsp, P ID2, P ID1) to get Nsr and Nsp, respectively. It then
sends E(γ : Nsr, Nsp, P ID1, P ID3) to Service requester and Service provider.
Service requester and Service provider can authenticate Broker by veri-
fying Nsr and Nsp.
(6) After receiving messages, Service provider first decrypts E(γ : Nsr, P ID2, P ID3)
and E(γ : Nbr, P ID1, P ID3) to get Nsr and Nbr, respectively. It then
sends E(γ : Nsr, Nbr, P ID1, P ID2) to Service requester and Broker. Ser-
vice requester and Broker can authenticate Broker by verifying Nsr and
Nbr.
After Service requester, Broker and Service provider authenticate each other,
they go to the next step - Session Key Establishment.
Step 2.2. Session Key Establishment
Service requester, Broker and Service provider will establish a shared secret
key through running the following protocol. One may wonder why selecting
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a three-party schema for it. It is true there are multi-party methods to make
secret sharing efficient by encrypting the secret, giving the encrypted secret
to one participant and sharing the small encryption key among the others.
However, this multi-party encryption method would introduce expensive cost
as it will need a pre-built secure communication channel to deliver the small
encryption key to other users. Fortunately, our method which adopted three-
party schema does not need a pre-built secure communication channel.
(1) With Service requester and Broker’s public keys, Service provider can use












Service provider then computes
d1 = θ(c, f(b, c))
and
d2 = β(c, f(a, c)).
Finally, Service provider sends d1 ·d2 ∈ T to Service requester and Broker.
(2) With Broker and Service provider’s public keys, Service requester can use












Service requester then computes
d3 = β(a, f(b, a))
and
d4 = θ(a, f(c, a)).
Finally, Service requester sends d3 ·d4 ∈ T to Service provider and Broker.
(3) With Service requester and Service provider’s public keys, Broker can use














d5 = θ(b, f(a, b))
and
d6 = β(b, f(c, b)).
Finally, Broker sends d5 ·d6 ∈ T to Service requester and Service provider.
(4) Service requester computes K1 = H(β(a, f(b, a))·(θ(c, f(b, c))·β(c, f(a, c)))).
(5) Broker computes K2 = H(θ(b, f(a, b)) · (θ(c, f(b, c)) · β(c, f(a, c)))).
(6) Service provider computes K3 = H((θ(b, f(a, b))·β(b, f(c, b)))·β(c, f(a, c))).
The shared secret key of Service requester, Broker and Service provider is
k = K1 = K2 = K3 = H(β(a, f(b, a)) · θ(c, f(b, c)) · θ(a, f(c, a))) ∈ T.
Step 3. Session Key Confirmation
In order to confirm the session has been successfully established, Service re-
quester, Broker and Service provider execute the following steps.
(1) Service requester sends {A = H(K1, P ID1, tmp1), P ID1, stmp1} to Bro-
ker and Service provider. stmp1 is the current time-stamp of Service re-
quester.
(2) Broker sends {B = H(K2, P ID2, tmp2), P ID2, tmp2} to Service provider
and Service requester. tmp2 is the current time-stamp of Broker.
(3) Service provider sends {C = H(K3, P ID3, tmp3), P ID3, tmp3} to Service
requester and Broker. tmp3 is the current time-stamp of Service provider.
(4) Suppose the current time-stamps are respectively tmp21 and tmp31 when
Service requester receives the messages from Broker and Service provider,
respectively. Service requester first checks |tmp21 − tmp2| and |tmp31 −
tmp3| are both less than an acceptable time threshold. It then checks
whether B = H(K1, P ID2, tmp2) and C = H(K1, P ID3, tmp3). If both
checks are yes, then Service requester believes that the secret key is suc-
cessfully established.
(5) Suppose the current time-stamps are respectively tmp12 and tmp32 when
Broker receives the messages from Service requester and Service provider,
respectively. Broker first checks |tmp12 − tmp1| and |tmp32 − tmp3| are
both less than an acceptable time threshold. Broker checks whether A =
14
H(K2, P ID1, tmp1) and C = H(K2, P ID3, tmp3). If both checks are yes,
then Broker believes that the secret key is successfully established.
(6) Suppose the current time-stamps are respectively tmp13 and tmp23 when
Service provider receives the messages from Service requester and Broker,
respectively. Service provider first checks |tmp13 − tmp1| and |tmp23 −
tmp2| are both less than an acceptable time threshold. Service provider
checks whether A = H(K3, P ID1, tmp1) and B = H(K3, P ID2, tmp2). If
both checks are yes, then Service provider believes that the secret key is
successfully established.
If Service requester, Broker and Service provider all get ‘ yes ’ in the above
steps, then the Session Key Confirmation procedure returns ‘ true ’.
Notice that {A = H(K1, P ID1, tmp1), P ID1, tmp1}, {B = H(K2, P ID2, tmp2), P ID2, tmp2}
and {C = H(K3, P ID3, tmp3), P ID3, tmp3} are transferred in clear. In order
to maintain the privacy of all the three parties, we require PID1, PID2, and
PID3 are the pseudo ID of Service requester, Broker, and Service provider,
respectively. Here, pseudo ID means that PID1 is not the real identity of Ser-
vice requester, but it can be used to identify Service requester uniquely by the
involved parties, e.g. the Broker and the Service provider.
Step 4. Transaction Encryption and Service Delivery
Once the shared key is created, an encrypted connection can be set up between
Service requester, Broker and Service provider. Encryption is applied to SOAP
messages instead of transport layer packets like SSL does. Here, we do not
spend space on the SOAP messages construction but focus on the encryption
and service delivery. Please reference [1, 5, 7, 42] for the details of SOAP
messages.
(1) By the resource requirement set by Service requester, Service provider
prepares the service $. $ is then encrypted with Service provider’s secret
key K3 along with PID1, PID2, and PID3 to get
ε = EK3($,PID1, P ID2, H(K3), P ID3).
Service provider then sends ε, PID3 and PID1 to Service requester.
(2) After receiving ε, PID3 and PID1, Service requester first verifies PID3
and PID1 are correct. He then uses his secret key K1 to decrypt ε and
checks whether H(K1) = H(K3). If yes, then Service requester believes
the service is originally from Service provider and accepts this service.
Otherwise, he sends request to Broker for getting correct service.
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Fig. 3. The flowchart of the proposed secure resource delivery.
In the above procedure, due to the shared key
k = K1 = K2 = K3 = H(β(a, f(b, a)) · θ(c, f(b, c)) · θ(a, f(c, a))) ∈ T,
we therefore have H(K1) = H(K3). In the following section, we will discuss
the security of the proposed scheme.
5 Security Discussion
We first explain why Service requester, Broker and Service provider can have
the shared secret key k = H(β(a, f(b, a)) ·θ(c, f(b, c)) ·θ(a, f(c, a))) ∈ T. Then
we show an adversary cannot work out the shared secret key.
5.0.1 Service requester, Broker and Service provider can share the same key
k
Throughout the process of Step 1, 2 and 3 in Section 4, we get the following:
• Service requester has d3 and d1 · d2 and can compute d7 = d3 · (d1 · d2).
• Broker has d5 and d1 · d2 and can compute d8 = d5 · (d1 · d2).
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• Service provider has d2 and d5 · d6 and can compute d9 = (d5 · d6) · d2.
To explain Service requester, Broker and Service provider share the key
k = H(β(a, f(b, a)) · θ(c, f(b, c)) · θ(a, f(c, a))),
it is sufficient to show
H(d7) = H(d8) = H(d9) = k.
Using the three Axioms specified in Step 1 of Section 4, we can get the following
relations:
H(d7) = H(d3 · (d1 · d2)) (7)
= H(β(a, f(b, a)) · (θ(c, f(b, c)) · β(c, f(a, c)))) (8)
= H(β(a, f(b, a)) · θ(c, f(b, c)) · β(c, f(a, c))) (9)
= H(β(a, f(b, a)) · θ(c, f(b, c)) · θ(a, f(c, a))) (10)
= k. (11)
H(d8) = H(d5 · (d1 · d2)) (12)
= H(θ(b, f(a, b)) · (θ(c, f(b, c)) · β(c, f(a, c)))) (13)
= H(β(a, f(b, a)) · (θ(c, f(b, c)) · θ(a, f(c, a)))) (14)
= H(β(a, f(b, a)) · θ(c, f(b, c)) · θ(a, f(c, a))) (15)
= k. (16)
H(d9) = H((d5 · d6) · d2) (17)
= H((θ(b, f(a, b)) · β(b, f(c, b))) · β(c, f(a, c))) (18)
= H((β(a, f(b, a)) · β(b, f(c, b))) · θ(a, f(c, a))) (19)
= H(β(a, f(b, a)) · θ(c, f(b, c)) · θ(a, f(c, a))) (20)
= k. (21)
5.1 Two-way authentication
As specified in Step 2.1 of Section 4, the following steps are used to provide
two-way authentication mechanism.
(1) Service requester sends PID1, and E(γ : Nsr, P ID2, P ID3) to Broker and
Service provider. Here E(.) is a symmetric encryption algorithm (AES can
be a candidate). Nsr is a nounce which is used to differentiate different
authentication copies.
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(2) Broker sends PID2 and E(γ : Nbr, P ID1, P ID3) to Service requester and
Service provider. Nbr is a nounce which is used to differentiate different
authentication copies.
(3) Service provider sends PID3 and E(γ : Nsp, P ID2, P ID1) to Broker and
Service requester. Nsp is a nounce which is used to differentiate different
authentication copies.
(4) After receiving messages, Service requester first decrypts E(γ : Nbr, P ID1, P ID3)
and E(γ : Nsp, P ID2, P ID1) to get Nbr and Nsp, respectively. It then
sends E(γ : Nbr, Nsp, P ID2, P ID3) to Broker and Service provider. Bro-
ker and Service provider can respectively authenticate Service requester
by verifying Nbr and Nsp, respectively .
(5) After receiving messages, Broker first decrypts E(γ : Nsr, P ID2, P ID3)
and E(γ : Nsp, P ID2, P ID1) to get Nsr and Nsp, respectively. It then
sends E(γ : Nsr, Nsp, P ID1, P ID3) to Service requester and Service provider.
Service requester and Service provider can respectively authenticate Bro-
ker by verifying Nsr and Nsp, respectively.
(6) After receiving messages, Service provider first decrypts E(γ : Nsr, P ID2, P ID3)
and E(γ : Nbr, P ID1, P ID3) to get Nsr and Nbr, respectively. It then
sends E(γ : Nsr, Nbr, P ID1, P ID2) to Service requester and Broker. Ser-
vice requester and Broker can respectively authenticate Broker by veri-
fying Nsr and Nbr, respectively .
5.1.1 Security of f(a, b), f(c, b), f(a, c), f(b, c), f(b, a) and f(c, a)
Without Service requester’s private key, an adversary cannot compute f(b, a)












The security of f(a, b), f(c, b), f(a, c), and f(b, c) can be derived similary.
5.1.2 Security of β(a, f(b, a)), θ(a, f(c, a)), θ(c, f(b, c)) and θ(a, f(c, a))
To identify the input a and f(b, a) to the function β are both computably infea-
sible for an adversary in polynomial time. a is a secret key of Service requester
while the adversary cannot compute f(b, a) in polynomial time. Therefore, the
adversary cannot work out β(a, f(b, a)). Similarly, an adversary cannot work
out θ(a, f(c, a)) and θ(c, f(b, c)) in polynomial time.
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5.1.3 Security against cut-and-paste or replaying attacks
An attacker targeting at an old session key may mount a cut-and-paste or
replaying attack on the session key confirmation by copying some overdue
transaction messages and replaying them with Service requester, Broker or
Service provider. Assume the target is Broker to whom the attacker tries to
compromise. Suppose the attacker got the i-th message
{B = H(K2(i), P ID2, tmp2(i)), P ID2, tmp2(i)}
which was the copy that Broker sent to Service provider and Service requester
in the i-th turn/round of web service transactions, where K2(i) was the ses-
sion key established in the i-th turn/round of web service transactions and
tmp2(i) was the time-stamp when Broker sent this message. The session key
confirmation in section 4 can resist cut-and-paste or replaying attacks. This
is because if the attacker wants to fool Service requester and Service provider
successfully into believing the overdue session key K2(i) is a new session key
K2(i + j) which is established by Service provider, Broker and Service re-
quester in the (i + j)-th session key establishment. The attacker by replaying
{B = H(K2(i), P ID2, tmp2(i)), P ID2, tmp2(i)} needs to convince respectively
Service requester and Service provider of the following conditions:
(1) |tmp21(i+ j)− tmp2(i)| is less than the pre-set acceptable time threshold
θ̂. B = H(K1(i + j), P ID2, tmp2(i)) is true.
Here tmp21(i + j) is the time-stamp when Service requester received
the message {B = H(K2(i), P ID2, tmp2(i)), P ID2, tmp2(i)} from the at-
tacker; K1(i + j) is the (i + j)-th session key Service requester has.
(2) |tmp23(i+ j)− tmp2(i)| is less than the pre-set acceptable time threshold
θ̂. B = H(K3(i + j), P ID2, tmp2(i)) is true.
Here tmp23(i + j) is the time-stamp when Service provider received the
message {B = H(K2(i), P ID2, tmp2(i)), P ID2, tmp2(i)} from the at-
tacker; K3(i + j) is the (i + j)-th session key Service provider has.
It is obvious that all the above conditions will not be true. This is because the
time slot between when Broker sent {B = H(K2(i), P ID2, tmp2(i)), P ID2,
tmp2(i)} to Service requester and Service provider in the i-th session and
when Service requester and Service provider received the replayed message
{B = H(K2(i), P ID2, tmp2(i)), P ID2, tmp2(i)} from the attack in the (i+ j)-
th session is too big. This will result in |tmp21(i + j) − tmp2(i)| > θ̂ and
|tmp23(i + j)− tmp2(i)| > θ̂. In addition, it is easy to see that
B 6= H(K1(i + j), P ID2, tmp2(i))
and
B 6= H(K3(i + j), P ID2, tmp2(i)).
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Therefore, Service requester and Service provider will both not accept this
session key confirmation initiated by the attacker. Hence, the cut-and-paste
or replaying attacks will not work.
5.1.4 Security against existing attacks on braid group based cryptographic
primitives
Braid group based cryptographic primitives were first proposed by Anshel et
al. in [8, 49, 11, 12]. One of those primitives is a commutator key agreement
protocol based on braid groups and their colored Burau representation [8].
Lee et al. proposed a summit set attack on Anshel et al.’s protocol [8, 15].
In fact, the protocols in [8] which were broken by Lee et al. were only some
instances of the key agreement based on braid groups. That attack could not
be applied to the generic construction of Anshel et al.’s protocol [8]. Therefore,
that attack could not be applied to our three-party key establishment either.
This is because (1) our key agreement is a generic construction; (2) our key
agreement is based on non-commutative monoids; (3) the key agreement is
one-time per key establishment.
In [44], Vasco et al. proposed two attacks on a public key cryptosystem based
on free partially commutative monoids and groups. However, their attacks can-
not be applied to our three-party key agreement protocol. This is because: On
the one hand, their attacks are ciphertext only attacks and chosen ciphertext
attacks while our protocol is key agreement. On the other hand, the monoids
in our paper are assumed to be non-commutative.
Based on the above discussion, we can get the adversary cannot work out the
shared secret key k = H(β(a, f(b, a)) · θ(c, f(b, c)) · θ(a, f(c, a))) using existing
attacks .
5.1.5 Security against spoofing attack
A spoofing attack is a situation in which one person or program successfully
masquerades as another by falsifying data and thereby gaining an illegitimate
advantage. In our scheme, spoofing attack is not possible due to the fact that
there is no identity information transferred in cleartext [41, 42]. There is only
a pseduo ID PIDi(i = 1, 2, 3) which cannot be used by attackers to identify
Service requester, Broker or Service provider. For example, if an attacker tries
to make spoofing attack on Service requester, she may fake a pseudo ID PIDj.
In order to pass the session key confirmation verifying made by Broker or
Service provider, the attacker needs to find an element x0 to calculate an A
′
so that
A′ = H(x0, P IDj, tmp1) = H(K1, P IDj, tmp1).
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However, the attacker will encounter the one-way hash function intractability.
Therefore, she cannot make a successful spoofing attack on Service requester.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we proposed a secure web service scheme for service delivery. This
protocol used two-way authentication and three-party key establishment to re-
alize the security requirements for service delivery in network environments.
Our method can help to reduce communication and computation overheads.
This is because in our model there is only one shared key was established for
Service requester, Broker and Service provider. After two-way authentication,
they can use this key for the service delivery using symmetric encryption. Sym-
metric encryption is more efficient than asymmetric encryption with regard
to computation cost. We have discussed the shared keys’ security, the security
against some existing attacks on algebraic method based key establishment
and the spoofing resistance.
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